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ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: INTERPRETATION,
ANALYSIS, AND PROBLEMS
by Janice C. Vyn
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code' was adopted to provide a
coherent and systematic framework for ordering the relationships between
buyers and sellers of goods in the market place. 2 Although the scope and
treatment of this area by the Code was mainly an attempt to codify and
elucidate the basic contract and property principles governing the law of
sales, the Code was innovative in several respects. Nowhere have these
changes been more evident than in the area of contractual anticipatory
repudiation. Not only did the Code recategorize this long-recognized con-
tract principle, but it also expanded and modified the rights and remedies
available to the aggrieved party in such instances. 3
The objectives of this Comment are fourfold: first, to examine the sections
of the Code dealing with anticipatory repudiation, specifically, sections 2-609
and 2-610; second, to demonstrate how these Code provisions have been
interpreted by the courts; third, to compare these sections with pre-Code law
in principle and application; and finally, to analyze critically the Code's
treatment of this concept and suggest possible areas where the Code's
approach could be improved by revision.
1. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION: CONCEPT AND THEORY
A general principle of contract law is that any failure to perform an
absolute contractual duty constitutes a breach. 4 Repudiation is a particular
type of breach which arises when a promisee manifests his intent to the
1. Unless otherwise noted all references to the Uniform Commercial Code will be
to the 1972 Official Text and Comments. The sections of the Code considered in this
Article have not been altered in any significant way by the various adopting legislatures
unless otherwise indicated. The Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted by forty-
nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands. Only Louisiana remains
without the Code. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 2 (1970).
2. Some have suggested that despite this fundamental purpose article 2 is by no
means a coherent and systematic treatment of the law of sales. See Peters, Remedies
for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199 (1963).
3. It has been suggested that, in actuality, no real changes were made in pre-exist-
ing Texas law by the Code's adoption. See Comment, Anticipatory Breach of Contract:
A Comparison of the Texas Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 TEXAS L. REV.
744 (1952). However, such a view fails to take into consideration the total impact of
the Code on the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation and the various interpretations of
the Code's provisions which could be and have been adopted by the courts.
4. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 312 (1932).
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promisor that he will not perform according to the requirements set forth in
the contract. Clearly, a breach exists when this repudiation occurs at the
time and place for performance. Problems arise, however, if this repudia-
tion occurs before the performance is due under the contract. Since the
absolute duty to perform has not yet arisen according to the contract's terms,
in a strict sense no breach has occurred. Frequently, courts and legal
scholars have attempted to analyze the legal effect of this type of repudia-
tion, often termed an anticipatory repudiation.5 In so doing, they have been
confronted with various problems. What constitutes an anticipatory repudia-
tion? What are the rights of the aggrieved party in such an instance? Must
he await a performance which will, most probably, not be forthcoming? Must
he tender a useless delivery or can he suspend his own contractual duties?
Does he have an immediate right to damages and, if so, how are they to be
calculated?
A. Common Law Repudiation
Early common law did not recognize a right to sue for an anticipatory
repudiation. Due to a mechanistic view of contract relations the courts felt
that anticipatory repudiation of a contract was theoretically impossible. To
bring an action predicated upon a breach, both an expiration of the time
specified for performance in the contract and a failure to perform on that or
a subsequent date were necessary. 6 This rule was relaxed by the English
courts in the case of Hochster v. De la Tour7 which held that an action for
breach of contract prior to the performance date was not premature. A
breach by virtue of an anticipatory repudiation was subsequently recognized
by many courts in the United States.8 In Roehm v. Horst,9 a case brought
5. See generally Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contrac-
tual Duties, 22 MICH. L. REv. 329 (1924); Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, 14
HARV. L. REV. 317 (1901).
6. See, e.g., Phillpotts v. Evans, 151 Eng. Rep. 200 (Ex. 1839) (Baron Parke's
opinion).
7. 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B. 1853). In April of 1852 the plaintiff and the defend-
ant entered into a contract for employment wherein the plaintiff agreed to work for the
defendant for a fixed period of time beginning on June 1, 1852. On May 1, 1852, the
defendant informed the plaintiff that he would not perform. The plaintiff brought an
action for breach of contract on May 22, 1852, prior to the performance date set in
the contract. The defendant contended that no breach had occurred; but, in upholding
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the Court indicated that the action was not premature.
Lord Chief Justice Campbell theorized that instead of remaining idle or laying out
money for useless preparations, the plaintiff should be entitled to seek employment with
another employer so that the damages to which he would otherwise be entitled would
be mitigated. Id. at 926. Since mitigation of damages was the rationale expressed by
Lord Chief Justice Campbell to justify allowing the plaintiff to maintain the suit, the
reasoning of the case only leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff, because of the de-
fendant's prospective unwillingness to perform, should be excused from performance
without surrendering his right to sue after the breach occurs. The reasoning of the case
does not necessarily justify an immediate right to damages prior to a performance date.
The acceptance of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine was thus based on a faulty prem-
ise. This fact may account for much of the hostility to the doctrine's application. See
Terry, Book Review, 34 HAtv. L. REV. 891, 894 (1921).
8. See, e.g., Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N.Y. 633, 52 N.E. 671
(1899).
9. 178 U.S. 1 (1900). Fourteen years earlier the Court had refused to consider
the law on anticipatory repudiation. Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490 (1886).
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against an alleged repudiator who had deliberately destroyed 'the subject
matter of the contract prior to the performance date, the United States
Supreme Court formally accepted the principle. 10
The doctrine's conceptual difficulties can be overcome by a reaffirmation
of one of the primary aims of contract law-the protection of the aggrieved
party's reasonable expectation that performance will be forthcoming when
due." Consequently, courts have willingly implied in every contract a duty
not to repudiate.' 2  This duty, often articulated in terms of an implied
promise, might be breached even though the express promise of performance
on the contract date had not been breached. Criticism of the doctrine was
mainly directed toward its complicated and speculative damage measure.13
The suit for anticipatory repudiation, however, is for the most part brought
after the due date for performance so that damages can be determined just
as if the contract had been breached when performance was due.14 The
task of measuring damages for breach is actually no more complicated than
in several other instances when the law allows recovery for a legally
recognized wrong.' 5 A loss of expectation of performance is an injury
against which the law should offer protection, even though to do so may
create problems in the precise and accurate ascertainment of damages.1 6
Generally, the difficulties in measuring damages in anticipatory repudia-
tion cases can be resolved by merely awarding the aggrieved party the
benefit of his bargain. Notwithstanding the relationship between the trial
date and date of contract execution, damages can be measured by the
difference between the market price at the time of the repudiation and
the contract price together with incidental and consequential damages.17 The
courts, however, have been additionally presented with other *problems
concerning the definition of an anticipatory repudiation and its application to
specific fact situations.
B. The Requisite Elements
The courts and commentators have attempted to delineate the requisite
elements of an anticipatory repudiation. Corbin suggested that an anticipa-
tory repudiation occurred when a "definite and unequivocal" manifestation
of intent not to perform a "substantial" part of the contract was made either
10. Massachusetts at one time was considered in opposition to the remedy provided
by this doctrine. Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874). Ne-
braska was also considered as being in opposition. Vold, Repudiation of Contracts, 5
NEB. L. BULL. 269 (1927). Due to these states' adoption of § 2-610 of the Code,
however, they can no longer be considered as opposing the doctrine. See MASS. Gm.
LAws ANN. ch. 106 (1963); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 1-101 to 10-104 (1971).
11. Taylor, The Impact of Article 2 of the U.C.C. on the Doctrine of Anticipatory
Repudiation, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 917, 919 (1968).
12. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U.S. 581 (1916). See gener-
ally 4 A. CotBiN, CoTrRAcTs § 961 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Coaan.].
13. See, e.g., Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874).
14. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U.S. 581 (1916).
15. Taylor, supra note 11, at 919. Examples of such instances include the uncertain
damages measures applied to an invasion of the right of privacy, an intentional infliction
of emotional distress, or a recovery for pain and suffering.
16. Id. at 920.
17. See, e.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1900); Allen, Heaton & McDon-
ald v. Castle Farm Amusement Co., 151 Ohio St. 522, 86 N.E.2d 782 (1949).
1976]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
expressly or impliedly prior to the time of performance and was communicat-
ed either directly or indirectly to the other contracting party. 18 Some courts
relied on this definition,' 9 but others stated that only an "absolute repudia-
tion" constituted a breach wherein the repudiator would be liable for
damages. 20  In all such instances the repudiation had to be voluntary. 21
Consequently, the intent of the repudiator was the most important consider-
ation. 22 This voluntary intent could be shown through words or actions and
its determination was a question of fact.23  What actions or expressions by
the repudiator were sufficiently definite, unequivocal, and absolute to dem-
onstrate this intent? Even if the intent seemed clear, when did the
repudiation constitute a substantial breach of the contract? Were any
contracts excluded from the operation of the dootrine?24  Problems such as
these were resolved in divergent ways by individual courts.
The decisions defining the requisite intent were not consistent. Some
courts held that a statement of prospective inability to perform was not
sufficiently definite to constitute an anticipatory breach, 25 while other courts
disagreed. 20  Even an actual statement of intent not to perform created
difficulty for the party seeking remedies. Courts stated that so long as the
promisor recognized that the contract was binding, he could deny an
obligation of performance as demanded by the other party without his denial
18. CORBIN § 973.
19. See, e.g., Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co., 67 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.
1933).
20. Mutual Loan Soc'y v. Stowe, 15 Ala. App. 293, 73 So. 202 (1916); Timmerman
v. Stanley, 123 Ga. 850, 51 S.E. 760 (1905); Parker v. King, 68 Ga. App. 672, 23 S.E.2d
575 (1942); Johnson v. Tackitt, 173 Ky. 406, 191 S.W. 117 (1917). To be absolute,
there must be a refusal by one party to perform an executory contract containing mutual
obligation. Parker v. King, 68 Ga. App. 672, 23 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1942).
21. See, e.g., Union Ins. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 157 N.Y. 633, 52 N.E. 671
(1899).
22. Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 681 (1936), with
Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530, 19 Am. Rep. 384 (1874).
23. See, e.g., Dudzick v. Degrenia, 48 R.I. 430, 138 A. 57 (1927).
24. Anticipatory repudiation was clearly a valid cause of action or defense in a suit
based on a bilateral contract. A right of action would be extinguished, however, if it
appeared that an aggrieved party could not perform his return promise at the time of
the breach. See, e.g., Rubinger v. Rippey, 201 Misc. 135, 110 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct.
1951). Based on this supposition, some courts held that there could be no cause of ac-
tion for an anticipatory repudiation in a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract which
had become unilateral due to performance by one party since the return party could not
remain ready, willing, and able to perform when he had already carried out his contrac-
tual duties. See, e.g., General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. Gorcee, 296 F. 32 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 266 U.S. 610 (1924). Corbin disagreed with such decisions. CORBIN §
962. This problem has not been resolved by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610
which is not explicitly limited to bilateral contracts. Criticism has been directed
toward the Code because of this deficiency. See Williston, supra note 5. The Restate-
ment, however, specifies that the rule of anticipatory repudiation does not apply to a
unilateral contract or an executed bilateral contract. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §
318 (1932).
25. McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1955) (statement
by subcontractor that he was having difficulty obtaining necessary materials accom-
panied by a request for assistance); Salot v. Wershow, 157 Cal. App. 2d 352, 320 P.2d
926 (1958) (statement of prospective inability to pay the contract price when due and
a request for an extension).
26. De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Triangle Radio Supply Co., 243 N.Y. 283,
153 N.E. 75 (1926) (statement of prospective inability to perform due to an injunction
obtained by a third party constituted a breach).
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amounting to an anticipatory breach. 27  Likewise, a party who demanded
performance based on an incorrect interpretation of a contractual provision
was not guilty of a repudiation. 28  Voluntary acts were held to excuse the
aggrieved party from performance. 29  But, in certain cases, involuntary acts
were found by the courts to be sufficiently definite and unequivocal.3 0
Because of these conflicting decisions, many parties who had suspended their
own performances and instituted suit in reliance on the belief that the
particular contract had been repudiated found themselves in a position where
they, not the original repudiators, were the parties guilty of the anticipatory
breach.
After these questions concerning the actual intent of the repudiator were
defined and answered by the courts, still other problems remained to be
considered. Clearly, not all anticipatory repudiations amount to a substantial
breach of the contract. Thus, the courts had to decide whether the
repudiation itself was a total or partial breach. Again, the courts of
different jurisdictions reached divergent results. 31 There was no simple test
to ascertain whether a breach was material3 2 and, if the breach was only
partial, the consequences were significantly different. As Corbin suggested,
not all anticipatory repudiations would 'amount -to a total breach; to be total
the anticipatory repudiation had to be either with respect to the entire
performance that was promised or so material as to go to the essence of the
contract.3
3
In an effort to resolve ambiguities surrounding the doctrine and to reconcile
the courts' decisions, the Restatement of Contracts specified three actions
27. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936); Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co. v. Klotz, 251 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1958).
28. Kimel v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (10th Cir. 1934); Milton
v. H.C. Stone Lumber Co., 36 F.2d 583 (S.D. I11. 1928), a!f'd, 36 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.
1929). However, Corbin suggested that even if, by mistake, a party demanded perform-
ance when he had no such right under the contract, an anticipatory breach had been
committed. CoRBIN § 973.
29. See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1 (1900) (destruction of the subject matter held
to be voluntary); Bowdell v. Parsons, 103 Eng. Rep. 811 (Q.B. 1808). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318(c) (1932).
30. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U.S. 581 (1916) (adjudication
of bankruptcy held to be sufficiently voluntary to excuse aggrieved party from perform-
ance). Insolvency alone has been held insufficient, even though it makes performance
an apparent impossibility and is similar to the bankruptcy situation. See, e.g., Minnea-
polis Iron Store Co. v. E.G. Staude Mfg. Co., 153 Minn. 107, 189 N.W. 596 (1922);
Phenix Nat'l Bank v. Waterbury, 197 N.Y. 161, 90 N.E. 435 (1910). Arrest or impris-
onment of the promisor, clearly an involuntary act, has been held to support a claim
based on the anticipatory repudiation doctrine. Leopold v. Salkey, 89 Ill. 412 (1878).
31. A repudiation of a long-term lease, an abandonment of the premises, and a re-
fusal to pay an installment of rent have been held to be sufficiently "total." Hawkinson
v. Johnston, 122 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941). But an
insurer's letter to the insured, which stated that medical and other proof received by
the insurer showed that the insured was not totally disabled, that disability benefits
would no longer be paid, and that the insurer was restoring the policy to a premium
basis, did not constitute a breach of the entire contract of insurance. Lauro v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 377 (D.N.J. 1948). Where there has been a
partial breach coupled with a repudiation, the breach is total. Gold Mining & Water
Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Cal. 2d 19, 142 P.2d 22 (1943).
32. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 157 (1970).
33. CORBIN § 972. If the breach is only partial, however, Corbin can be inter-
preted as still allowing a suit for partial breach. Squillante, Anticipatory Repudiation
and Retraction, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 373, 380 (1973).
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which constituted an anticipatory repudiation: (1) a positive statement to
the promisee or other person having a right under the contract, indicating that
the promisor will not or cannot substantially perform his contractual duties;
(2) transferring or contracting to transfer to a third person an interest in
specific land, goods, or in any other thing essential for the substantial
performance of his contractual duties; and (3) any voluntary affirmative act
which renders substantial performance of his contractual duties impossible or
apparently impossible.3 4
The Uniform Sales Act, which was adopted prior to the Restatement,
recognized that the aggrieved party had an immediate cause of action due to
an anticipatory repudiation. 5 Under this statute, however, the repudiating
buyer or seller had a valid defense if he could show that the other party had
manifested an intention or an inability to perform before the repudiation was
made. 36 The test for determining whether an anticipatory repudiation had
occurred was less rigid than had existed under prior law. But the only
remedy provided was a right to rescind the entire contract and demand
restitution.3 7 The aggrieved party was also required to give the repudiating
party notice that he was rescinding the contract.38
These attempts at codification of the law of anticipatory repudiation were
by no means adequate or complete. Most of the courts attempting to apply
the doctrine were still only concerned with one question: whether the acts of
the promisor indicated that he could not reasonably be expected to perform.
The decisions turned on the peculiarities of the individual fact situations and
the ultimate impressions and instincts of the trier of fact. The Code's
sections 2-609 and 2-610 were enacted to remedy these problems. This
remedy was not merely a codification of the common law, the Restatement
provisions, and the Uniform Sales Act. Many innovative features were
added by the Code's definitional and remedial provisions.
II. ANTICIPATORY REPUDIATION UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Adequate Assurance
Section 2-60939 recognizes the right of an aggrieved party who believes
that a repudiation has occurred to demand adequate assurances of perform-
ance in writing. 40  If a seller or buyer has "reasonable" grounds for feeling
"insecure," that is, if his "expectation of receiving due performance" is
"impaired," he may demand in writing assurances from the alleged repudia-
tor and, at the same time, suspend any performance for which he has
34. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1932). Prospective inability to perform
was thus recognized as valid grounds for a suit based on an anticipatory repudiation.
See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
35. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 63(2) (superceded by UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 65.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609.
40. This was not stated in the Original Draft of May 1949. See UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-609 (1949 version).
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not already received the agreed return. A commercial standard rather than
a legal standard is applied to determine both the reasonableness of the
insecurity and the assurance's adequacy. 41 The grounds for insecurity need
not arise from or be directly related to the contract in question.42  If the
alleged repudiator receives a justified demand he must provide the assurances
within thirty days or a repudiation of the contract results. 43  Even if a buyer
accepts an improper delivery under an installment contract, he still retains
his right to demand adequate assurances. 44
Although the right to demand assurances appears to be a new concept, the
basic principles underlying such a right are not without prior foundation in
case law.4" Section 2-609 merely implements the policy behind recognition
of the anticipatory repudiation doctrine that neither party's expectation of
receiving the promised return performance should be impaired.46 The fact
that the parties contract with a view toward performance by one another,
not merely for a promise or the right to win a law suit, also is implicit in this
section's provisions. Retention of the contract is the goal and premature
adjudication is aborted by forestalling, at least temporarily, the immediate
right to damages.4T
The difficulties presented by the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the
case law surrounding the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation are also
substantially alleviated by the adoption of section 2-609. 48 A number of
questions, however, are not answered by this section. For example, how
should "insecurity" be defined? How is the "adequacy" of this assurance to
be determined? Can there be an anticipatory repudiation without invoking
the written demand for assurance? Even if the adequate assurance is
forthcoming, can subsequent actions by the promisor ultimately result in an
anticipatory repudiation?
Since the test for determining insecurity depends on commercial standards,
the nature of the sales contract in question and the relationship between the
contracting parties are of prime importance. 49 In an effort to clarify the
definition of insecurity, the comment to section 2-609 cites the fact situation
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609(2).
42. Id., Comment 3.
43. The Original Draft specified a 10-day limit. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-609(4) (1949 version); compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609 (1962 ver-
sion).
44. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609(3).
45. The comments to this section cite cases in which the right to demand assur-
ances was alluded to although not formally adopted. Id., Comments 3-4.
46. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609(1).
47. Id., Comment 1.
48. If there has been no outright, absolute, or unequivocal repudiation by the prom-
isor, the seller or buyer can demand written assurances rather than instituting suit and
cancelling the contract based on a repudiation which a court might find has not actually
occurred. Thus, when the intent of the repudiating party is unclear or when the mate-
riality of the breach is questionable, an aggrieved party by demanding assurances can
discover the nature and extent of the return party's actions without jeopardizing his posi-
tion in regard to the contract. This provision recognizes that, in certain situations, juris-
dictional definitions of the requisite elements constituting an anticipatory repudiation
may not be clearly defined. Id.
49. Id., Comment 3. By use of the term reasonable, this test also implies a specific
application of the Code's merchant good faith provision. Id. § 2-103 (1) (b).
1976]
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which occurred in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Fasola5 ° as an illustration
of reasonable grounds for insecurity, and, therefore, a proper case for an
adequate assurance demand. After analyzing the contract involved in that
case, 51 the comment states that even false rumors relating to a buyer's
financial status are sufficient to entitle a seller to demand adequate assur-
ances.52 A suspicion of insolvency will thus support a demand. In his
Notes 3 Karl Llewellyn, the chief reporter of article 2, also made reference to
the case of Lander v. Samuel Heller Leather Co. 4 for the purpose of
explaining insecurity. According to Llewellyn, after a defective delivery is
received by a buyer under an installment contract, he is entitled to demand
assurances, but he cannot repudiate the entire contract unless the defective
delivery substantially impairs the value of the contract.55 Under the Code's
formulation an assignment delegating performance is also said to give
reasonable grounds for insecurity.56
As in the case of insecurity, the adequacy of assurance is to be determined
by commercial standards. Adequacy is, therefore, dependent on factual
considerations. 57 Generally, a mere promise to cure a defective installment
is sufficient,5 but a similar promise from a known "corner-cutter" may not
be adequate.59 If a defective delivery interferes with the "easy use" 60 of
the buyer, there must not only be verbal assurances but also a replace-
ment.61 In this regard, the comment to section 2-609 also refers to the Corn
Products case, where the buyer, upon learning of the seller's hesitations
regarding his financial situation, furnished the seller with a good credit
report.6 2  This was an adequate assurance for the purposes of the Code.
Although jurisdictions applying the Code's formulation have further clari-
fied these notions, variations in interpretation still exist. In Gutor Interna-
50. 94 N.J.L. 181, 109 A. 505 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
51. The contract for the sale of oils on 30-days' credit, 2% off for payment within
10 days, provided that credit was to be extended to the buyer only if his financial respon-
sibility was satisfactory to the seller. The buyer had under previous contracts taken ad-
vantage of the discount, but in the contract involved in this case he failed to make his
customary payment within 10 days. At approximately the same time the seller heard
rumors, in fact false, that the buyer's financial position was questionable. 109 A. at
505-06.
52. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-609, Comment 4. The rumors were sufficient
even without the provision in the contract relating to the discount. Id.
53. Comment on § 7-10 (S98) at 6, as reproduced in Spies, Article 2: Breach Re-
pudiation and Excuse, 30 Mo. L. REV. 225, 243 (1965).
54. 314 Mass. 592, 50 N.E.2d 962 (1943).
55. The seller and the buyer contracted for the sale of 120,000 pounds of leather
to be delivered and paid for in installments. Upon receiving a defective installment,
the buyer refused to pay until the seller replaced the goods. The seller declined and
the court held that the seller was guilty of an anticipatory repudiation. 50 N.E.2d
at 965. According to Llewellyn, the buyer had reasonable grounds to feel insecure and
adequately demanded assurances from the seller. Comment on § 7-10 (S98) at 6, as
reproduced in Spies, supra note 53, at 243.
56. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-210(5).
57. Id. § 2-609, Comment 4.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The term "easy use" is utilized by the comment to show the relationship be-
tween the extent of the defect and the buyer's individual needs. Id.
61. Id.
62. 94 N.J.L. 181, 109 A. 505 (Ct. Err. & App. 1920).
[Vol. 30
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tional AG v. Raymond Packer Co. 63 a federal court held that insecurity
would not be a valid defense to a suit for purchase price when the party
claiming the defense has already received the agreed upon performance. In
this case an American distributor claimed that subsequent to his receipt of a
dictating equipment shipment from a Swiss corporation he discovered that
the promise for an exclusive dealership had been breached. Consequently,
he claimed that, prior to payment, he had a right to demand adequate
assurances. The court clearly rejected this position, stating that section 2-
609 did not provide a remedy when the bilateral contract had become
unilateral in nature. The buyer had the right to revoke his acceptance or
notify the seller of an offset stemming from the distributorship's termination,
but section 2-609 "does not terminate liability to pay for goods once in hand;
it merely authorizes an insecure party to withhold possibly costly advance
performance when the agreed return is in doubt."' 64 Prior to this decision,
however, a New York court relying on section 2-609 adopted a contrary
position.65 A buyer was allowed to withhold payment for an air condition-
ing unit after the original unit had malfunctioned and the seller had timely
replaced it. 6 The buyer was excused from performance entirely when the
seller failed to answer his demand for assurances that the new unit would
work during the following summer. 67
A contract's provisions can in some instances modify the operation and
application of section 2-609. Thus, an assignment of performance will not
automatically give rise to insecurity when the agreement itself provides
adequate security in the event of an assignment.6 8 On the other hand, a
contract term which allows a seller to demand the entire payment balance
and repossess delivered goods when he feels insecure is ineffective under
section 2-609.69 There can be adequate security without a resort to the
demand for assurance, but there can be no circumvention of the rights
afforded by section 2-609.7o Contrary to the specifications contained within
section 2-609, however, the mere fact that payment under one contract is not
63. 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 943; see note 40 supra and accompanying text.
65. Lockwood-Conditionaire Corp. v. Educational Audio Visual, Inc., 3 UCC REP.
SERV. 354 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 1966).
66. Id.
67. Id. Reasonable grounds for insecurity have been found when a film renter, con-
tracting for exclusive rights, learns that certain of the films contracted for have been
made available for television use. In re Prods. Unlimited, Inc., 3 UCC REP. SERV. 620(Veteran's Admin. 1966). Generally, the demand itself must not only be in writing but
must also be sufficiently specific. A mere request for an acceleration of payments due
to a buyer's unstable financial condition is not considered a demand. National Ropes,
Inc. v. National Diving Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 61 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc.. 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d 689 (1973);
see note 56 supra and accompanying text.
69. Wrightstone, Inc. v. Motter, 1 UCC REP. SERv. 170 (Pa. C.P. 1961).
70. Id. Under section 9-504, however, a secured party has the right upon default
by the debtor to take possession of the collateral and to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose
of it, applying the proceeds to the indebtedness. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504.
See, e.g., In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966). However, a
stipulation in connection with a secured transaction to the effect that the creditor re-
served the right, in the event of a default, to take possession of any and all items in-
volved in the transaction without demand, notice, or court order is void. Rochester Cap-




made when due does not necessarily justify insecurity as to a payment under
another contract when the provisions of the contracts grant the seller
excessive and, therefore, invalid powers of cancellation. 71
A major question remaining after the Code's adoption was resolved in
Kunian v. Development Corp. of America72 when the Connecticut Supreme
Court recognized the existence of a repudiation after adequate assurances of
performance had been given. In this case the buyer assured the insecure
seller that his outstanding indebtedness would be paid after the seller's
justified demand for assurance. The buyer failed to abide by this promise
and the seller was totally excused from performance without a subsequent
demand.73
B. Anticipatory Repudiation
According to section 2-610, entitled "Anticipatory Repudiation," when
either party repudiates the contract with respect to a performance not yet
due, the aggrieved party may wait a "commercially reasonable time" for the
repudiating party's performance,74 and at the same time resort to the normal
remedies for seller's or buyer's breach, in spite of the fact that he may have
urged retraction or notified the repudiator that he would await his perform-
ance. 75  In both these instances, the aggrieved party may suspend his own
return performance. 76 Additionally, the repudiation itself must "substantial-
ly impair the value of the contract" to the aggrieved party.
Section 2-610, however, does not contain a definition of the term "repu-
diation." Prior case law is therefore relevant to the meaning of this term. As
the comment to section 2-610 indicates, "anticipatory repudiation centers
upon an overt communication of intention or an action which renders
performance impossible."' "7 The repudiator's performance, however, need
not be literally or utterly impossible; it is sufficient if the action indicates a
rejection of the continuing obligation.78 A demand by one or both parties
for more than the contract requires is not in itself a repudiation unless it is
coupled with a statement not to perform except on these additional terms. 79
Clearly, if an assurance is not forthcoming within thirty days under section
2-609, there has been a repudiation under section 2-610. But what other
71. Northwest Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Continental Forest Prods., Inc., 261 Ore. 480,
495 P.2d 744 (1972).
72. 12 UCC REP. SERV. 1125 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1973).
73. Id.
74. This time limitation was added in the 1957 Official Edition. Compare UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610 (1957 version) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-610 (1949 version).
75. This provision was also added in the 1957 Official Edition.
76. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610(c).
77. Id., Comment 1.
78. Id., Comment 2.
79. Id. Llewellyn's Notes cite Lander v. Samuel Heller Co., 314 Mass. 592, 50
N.E.2d 962 (1943), to illustrate this situation. After the buyer in Lander discovered
the defective delivery, he demanded shipment of the remaining contract order in three
days. According to Llewellyn, the buyer's statements are not a repudiation (assuming
that the defect did not substantially impair the contract value) unless he refuses to con-
tinue with the contract if the deliveries are not forthcoming within that time. Comment
on § 7-11 (S99) at 2, as reproduced in Spies, supra note 53, at 243.
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actions or statements constitute an anticipatory repudiation? The resolution
of this question was again left to the courts. The facts and circumstances
justifying an anticipatory repudiation have been defined in divergent ways
by various courts. This is largely due to the fact that, as in the case of
insecurity, the question must be resolved by the trier of fact applying a
commercial standard.
Probably the most important case in this area is Fredonia Broadcasting
Corp. v. RCA Corp.s0 which was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1973. RCA
contracted to sell broadcasting equipment to the plaintiff. When the broad-
casting operation failed, the plaintiff claimed that the business venture was
unsuccessful due to RCA's repudiation of the contract: RCA had deliberate-
ly shipped the equipment on a delayed, erratic, and incomplete basis; any
equipment RCA had delivered was not suitable for the use for which it was
sold; and RCA had failed to provide the necessary personnel required by the
contract to supervise the installation of the equipment s.8 The jury found a
repudiation of the contract. On appeal, RCA claimed that, as a matter of
law, the existence of an anticipatory repudiation under the Code could not
be determined on the basis of the quality of performance. RCA contended
that the test should be "actions which . . . demonstrate a clear determina-
tion not to continue with performance."8s2 Rather than formally reject this
proposition, the court stated that the jury had sufficient evidence to support a
finding that RCA's conduct demonstrated a fixed intention to renounce. 83
At the same time, however, the court found the jury instructions fatally
defective since they failed to state that these actions must substantially
impair the value of the contract. 84 The Fifth Circuit spelled out the two-
pronged test: the conduct or words must show an intent on the part of the
promisor not to continue with the contract obligations, and -the acts of repudi-
ation must substantially impair the value of the contract to the return party.
This decision also made it apparent that the type of conduct and the materi-
ality of the breach were questions of fact to be decided by the jury. Conse-
quently, the jury could base its conclusion on the quality of performance.
According to the Fifth Circuit's holding the question of whether a repudiation
has occurred will infrequently be decided, absent an outright repudiation, as a
matter of law. As a consequence, when the effect or nature of the
repudiator's actions is unclear, there are no definitive guidelines for deter-
mining whether an anticipatory repudiation has taken place. 85
80. 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 793. This contention was remarkably similar to the repudiation test ap-
plied prior to the Code, a test based on the probability that performance will not be
forthcoming. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
82. 481 F.2d at 793.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Due to this uncertainty a buyer's failure to make payment on delivery as re-
quired by an installment contract and a stop-payment on the subsequent check did not
constitute an anticipatory repudiation when the seller's action of demanding immediate
action appeared to be unreasonable to the jury. Laredo Hides Co. v. H. & H. Meat
Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
A refusal to accept delivery has been found to be an anticipatory repudiation. Multi-




Since a finding of insecurity or anticipatory repudiation is dependent on
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction, it is quite possible
that there could never be an ordered pattern in the decisions. The
uncertainties resulting from the recognition of the principle, its definition,
and its application were, therefore, not completely alleviated by the Code's
attempted clarification. In fact, the intent of the Code formulators was to
leave these questions unresolved.8 6 The formulators based their tests on
commercial rather than legal standards and left the ultimate determination of
what constitutes insecurity or an anticipatory repudiation to the trier of fact.
A long recognized principle of law is that the trier of fact is in the best
position to determine the fact issues involved in a case by weighing the
evidence which has been presented at trial. Since the trier of fact is present
when the evidence is introduced, the credibility of the witnesses can be
evaluated and a more appropriate conclusion concerning the actual occur-
rences and the reasonableness of the actions can be reached. In anticipatory
repudiation situations the trier of fact can best determine whether a breach
which has substantially impaired the value of the contract has occurred.
When this threshold question has been answered, the law can structure the
outcome between the parties involved in the litigation. As a consequence, it
is to be expected that varying interpretations of superficially similar circum-
stances will result in such instances.
In any case, the commercial law, as an integral part of our economy,
should be applied uniformly in all jurisdictions. There is a definite need for
the other hand, a buyer's refusal to order goods to be manufactured according to the
contract is not an anticipatory repudiation when the seller is not ready, willing, and able
to perform. Erb v. Flower, 248 Cal. 2d 208, 56 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1967). An intervening
statute forbidding the transportation of contract goods from Canada into the United
States does not justify an American buyer's refusal to accept delivery from his Canadian
seller, and, thus, in such an instance the buyer has anticipatorily repudiated the contract.
Swift Canadian Co. v. Banet, 224 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1955). The seller's death, another
unforeseen, involuntary occurrence, will excuse the buyer from performance, however,
when it appears that the contract goods are nonexistent. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d
951 (8th Cir. 1974).
A unilateral modification can ripen into an anticipatory repudiation when a buyer
changes the specifications in a purchase order, despite the fact that the buyer does not
indicate that his performance is contingent on the seller's compliance with these new
specifications. R-Way Furniture Co. v. Power Interiors, Inc., 456 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Civ.
App. 1970). This case is not consistent with the Code provisions. See notes 74-79 su-
pra and accompanying text. Despite this fact, the court in R-Way stated that the jury
must decide if an anticipatory repudiation had occurred. 456 S.W.2d at 637. On the
other hand, a buyer was found to have repudiated the contract when he stopped payment
on a check believing the seller to have altered the terms of the contract by sending a
letter of confirmation which failed to include a material provision. Goldstein v. Stain-
less Processing Co., 465 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1972).
A request for an additional sum before the seller would tender performance has been
held to be a valid reason for the buyer's cancellation of the contract. Puget Sound Ma-
rina, Inc. v. Jorgenson, 3 Wash. App. 476, 475 P.2d 919 (1970). A buyer's request
for more goods at the original contract price, however, was not a valid reason for the
seller's refusal to perform. Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d
283 (7th Cir. 1974).
86. The text of the Code does not define the terms "insecurity" or "repudiation."
The text merely suggests factors which should be considered in determining the meaning
of these provisions. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-609, 2-610. Compare RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 318 (1932).
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guidelines which take into consideration the practical nature of sales transac-
tions. The uncertainty inherent in the Code's formulation can only lead to a
feeling of instability between buyers and sellers in the market place. In one
tax case, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 7 Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting
opinion criticized the majority's failure to define clearly the type of gift
which could be excluded from gross income. The majority had stated that
the determination of the donor's intent was a question of fact within the
province of the jury. Their ruling could only be overturned if a reasonable
man would have reached a different result.88 Justice Frankfurter reasoned,
however, that such a rule would lead to a lack of needed uniformity in the
application of the income tax laws.89 As an alternative he suggested that
the law prescribe different guidelines based on the status of the parties. 90
Similar guidelines should be promulgated in the commercial law area. This
is not to say, however, that the trier of fact should be completely ousted from
his role in anticipatory repudiation cases. As stated previously, there is
always a jurisprudential function to be served by this legal institution, and in
anticipatory repudiation situations the trier of fact can best determine the
nature of the factual situation to which the law is to be applied. Decisions
based on rules of law would fail to consider the situation of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding .the individual contract. Yet, the law on
anticipatory repudiation would be better defined and the relationships
between buyers and sellers would be more secure if various guidelines for
interpreting the Code's provisions were promulgated. There is a clear need
for categorization of certain actions as anticipatory repudiation and other
actions merely as grounds for insecurity.
The obvious solution to this problem is to require each aggrieved party to
demand adequate assurances following any type of inhibiting actions by the
promisor. Thus, even when an outright repudiation occurred, the aggrieved
party would be required to request a statement, perhaps written, from the
repudiator concerning his intent regarding the contract in question. Such a
rule would insure stability and security, but would not adequately reflect the
relationships between the parties. In some cases an aggrieved party may be
able to find a substitute transaction immediately following the repudiation, or
he may be able to mitigate damages. In any event, as the wronged party he
should not be placed in a position where his options are foreclosed.
87. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
88. Id. at 291.
89. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
Especially do I believe this [that there will be a production of a new vol-
ume of exegesis on the new phrases] when fact-finding tribunals are di-
rected by the Court to rely upon their 'experience . . .' in appraising the
totality of the facts of each case. Varying conceptions . . . are derived
from a variety of experiences or assumptions about the nature of man
.... What the Court now does sets fact-finding bodies to sail on an
illimitable ocean of individual beliefs and experiences. This can hardly
fail to invite, if indeed not encourage, too individualized diversities in the
administration of the income tax law. I am afraid that by these new
phrasings the practicalities of tax administration, which should be as uni-
form as is possible in so vast a country as ours, will be embarrassed.
Id. at 297.
90. Id. at 296.
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Guidelines could be framed to require a demand for adequate assurances
when the repudiating party's actions are anything less than an outright
repudiation. But, again, problems exist since many actions might not be
considered sufficiently definite to constitute an outright repudiation, and the
aggrieved party's financial position could be significantly jeopardized since in
the case of anything less than an outright repudiation his ability to mitigate
would be limited.
The best solution is to suggest in the comment section certain recurrent
fact situations which are reasonable grounds for insecurity and certain
recurrent fact situations which allow the aggrieved party to be totally
excused from performance. Any unilateral modification of a contract should
be reasonable grounds for insecurity so long as the performance is not
contingent on the proposed additional terms. Thus, if a buyer merely
demands extra goods under the original contract, the seller should be
required to demand assurances before he treats the contract as repudiated.
Similarly, if the seller varies ,the specifications of the contract goods or
requests an additional sum prior to performance, the comments should
provide that the buyer demand adequate assurances. A failure to abide by
conditions precedent should be reasonable grounds for insecurity and not an
outright repudiation. A mere suspicion of insolvency or insolvency itself,
whether affecting the contract in question or a collateral contract, should give
rise to the demand requirement.
The occurrence of involuntary intervening forces or unforeseen circum-
stances should also fall within the provisions contained in section 2-609. On
the other hand, an adjudication of bankruptcy, a unilateral modification of a
contract which demands performance according to the altered terms, a
refusal to accept delivery, a stop payment on the purchase price or the down
payment check, a refusal to make payment, or an absolute statement of
intent not to perform should all be considered anticipatory repudiations. If
such guidelines were incorporated in the Code, the provisions would more
adequately meet the needs of the business community.
Il. REMEDIES AND DAMAGES
According to section 2-610 the aggrieved buyer or seller can resort to any
remedy provided by section 2-703 or section 2-711. 91 A remedy is defined
as any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled with or without
resort to a tribunal.92  Section 2-703 gathers together in one convenient
place all of the various remedies open to a seller, whereas section 2-711
enunciates the remedies available to a buyer.
Thus, a buyer can: (1) recover as much of the price as he has paid, or in
other words, rescind the contract; (2) recover damages based on the market
price differential; (3) "cover" and be awarded the added costs incurred in
procuring substitute goods without having to demonstrate market price; (4)
91. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-610(b).
92. Id. § 1-201(34).
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in an appropriate case, sue for specific performance; 93 and (5) if the seller
is insolvent, tender performance and recover the goods.94
On the other hand, a seller can: (1) withhold or stop delivery of the
goods; (2) "resell" the goods and recover damages measured by the
difference between the unpaid contract price and the market price of the
goods; or (3) if this amount is insufficient to place the seller in as good a
financial position as performance, recover damages measured by his lost
profits; or (4) if the goods were incomplete at the time of the buyer's
anticipatory repudiation (a) complete the manufacture of the unfinished
goods and identify them to the contract; (b) resell the unfinished goods for
their salvage value; or (c) identify the unfinished goods to the contract and
proceed to recover under another appropriate remedy, such as resale or a
suit based on the market price differential. All of these remedies are
supplemented by a provision in the Code which allows law and equity to
intervene when a remedy is not specifically provided. 95 Incidental and
consequential damages can also be recovered, 96 but a repudiating party has
a limited right of retraction. 97
A. The Buyer's Options
Certainly, the most practiced alternative available to an aggrieved buyer is
the right to "cover." Section 2-712 states that a buyer may cover by making
in good faith and without reasonable delay any purchase or contract to
purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller.98 Recovery is
based on the difference between the cost of cover and the contract price
together with any incidental and consequential damages minus expenses
saved as a result of the seller's breach. The aggrieved buyer can prove his
damages easily by resorting to cover; all he has to show is that the cover was
effectuated in good faith, without unreasonable delay, and in substitution for
the contract goods.99 There is no need to prove market price; damages are
fixed when the cover option is utilized. There is, however, no mandatory
93. See, e.g., Field v. Golden Triangle Broadcasting, Inc., 451 Pa. 410, 305 A.2d
689 (1973).
94. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-502.
95. Id. § 1-103.
96. Id. § 2-715.
97. Id. § 2-611. So long as the aggrieved party has not cancelled the contract, ma-
terially changed his position, or otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation
final, such a retraction is effective. Cancellation of the contract requires a formal no-
tice to the repudiating party that the nonrepudiating party is treating the contract as hav-
ing ended. Id. § 2-106(4). On the other hand, section 2-611 also recognizes the right
to have an informal declaration by allowing the aggrieved party to indicate otherwise
to the promisor that he is treating the contract as ended. There are no formal require-
ments controlling the effectiveness of a retraction. Section 2-611(2) states that "[re-
traction may be by any method which clearly indicates to the aggrieved party that the
repudiating party intends to perform, but must include any assurance justifiably de-
manded under the provisions of this Article (Section 2-609)." The purpose of this sec-
tion is to promote the continuance of the contract and to give meaning to the recognition
of the expectation interest of each party. The right to retract exists, but it is severely
limited in order that the aggrieved party will not be burdened by a retraction after he
has acted pursuant to the repudiation.
98. Id. § 2-712(1).
99. Id. § 2-712(2).
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requirement that the buyer cover. 100 In fact, the buyer who purchases
substitute goods for less than market price can possibly sue for damages
rather than basing his recovery on the cover price.101
The buyer's right to damages is spelled out in section 2-713. Damages
are computed based upon the difference between the market price at the
time when the buyer "learned of" the breach or the repudiation and the
contract price together with any consequential and incidental damages
resulting from the seller's breach. 10 2 The market price, generally, is to be
determined at the time for tender. 10 3
The time question presents several problems for the aggrieved buyer in an
anticipatory repudiation situation. Cover is to be effectuated within a
reasonable time after the repudiation. Damages are to be measured at the
time the buyer "learned of" the repudiation. But, under section 2-610 the
buyer has a right to await performance. Thus, can the buyer upon learning
of a repudiation wait until performance date before covering? Is a "reason-
able time" to be calculated from the moment the buyer "learns of" the
repudiation by the seller or from the date that performance is due under the
contract? Is the performance date, as a matter of law, a reasonable time?
Are damages to be measured based on the market price on any date that the
buyer might choose between the actual repudiation and the time for perform-
ance? Or do the damages have ,to be calculated in terms of the market price
on the date that performance was due under the contract?
The intent of the Code formulators is not at all clear. One author has
suggested that Karl Llewellyn included this "learned of" provision in order to
aid an aggrieved party who is informed of a repudiation after performance
date, that the provision has no real relation to an anticipatory repudiation
case. 0 4 This time provision, however, was no more than a codification of
the New York common law. Two New York cases had held that the time
when the buyer knew of the default was determinative. In these cases the
buyer was not informed of the repudiation until after performance date.' 05
Karl Llewellyn may have been influenced by these decisions and utilized this
language in order to provide for this type of situation. If the time of the
100. Id. § 2-712(3).
101. See Honnold, 1 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REP. 569, 570 (1955). Although
criticized by some, this option has also been praised because it does not limit the options
of the aggrieved party, it is consistent with a number of other Code sections which do
not favor the premature election of remedies, it is easy to administer, and it encourages
recourse to actual market substitutes by guaranteeing to the injured party that he will
have some recourse in the event of an unusually unfavorable substitute contract. Peters,
supra note 2, at 261. Other problems presented by the cover option, such as the mean-
ing of reasonable commercial purchase and adjusting the difference between cover items
and those contracted for, are not within the scope of this Comment.
102. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-713 (1).
103. Id. When there is a revocation of acceptance after the goods have arrived, the
place for arrival is determinative of the market price. This will probably not affect a
suit for anticipatory repudiation, however, except in cases involving installment con-
tracts. Texas states that in either case the place of tender is determinative. TEX. Bus.
& COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.713(b) (1968). The parallel provision for the seller's dam-
ages directs the use of the "time and place for tender." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-708(1).
104. See Patterson, 1 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REP. 697 (1955).
105. See Perkins v. Minford, 235 N.Y. 301, 139 N.E. 276 (1923); Boyd v. L. H.
Quinn Co., 18 Misc. 169, 41 N.Y.S. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1896).
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breach was anything less than performance date, the performance date would
be determinative for purposes of measuring damages.
In this regard the provisions of section 2-723(1) are also important.
Under this section if an action for anticipatory repudiation comes to trial
before the time for performance, damages for either an aggrieved buyer or
seller should be determined according to the price of goods at the time the
aggrieved party learned of the repudiation.'00 If the aggrieved buyer's
damages for an anticipatory repudiation are always to be determined under
section 2-713 according to the time the buyer learned of the repudiation, the
pre-performance date trial provision has no meaning as it in fact relates to the
aggrieved buyer, even though it expressly states that it applies to the buyer.
Consequently, the time for performance should be determinative in such a
situation. At the same time, the comment to the Code states that the
requirement that the buyer must cover "without reasonable delay" is not
intended to limit the time necessary for him to decide how he may best
cover. 10 7 Thus, for all practical purposes the presumption is with the buyer
in terms of the time for cover, and, as a result, the right to await
performance is not abridged. A similar presumption should exist in the
damage measure.
The case of Oloffson v. Coomer'08 is significant to a determination of the
meaning of the Code sections relating to anticipatory repudiation. In
Oloffson a farmer repudiated his contract to sell corn to a grain dealer. The
buyer argued that the proper measure of damages should be based on the
market price at the date set for performance in the contract which was over
a year from the date of the repudiation. The trial court agreed, but the
Illinois Court of Appeals reversed, stating that although the buyer did indeed
have a right to await performance, this time expired on the date of the
repudiation. A buyer's right to await performance is conditioned upon his
waiting no longer than a commercially reasonable time within the meaning of
the good faith provisions of article 2.100 In this case the date of the
repudiation was held to be the only commercially reasonable time. 110
In order to solve the problem presented by the incongruities in the Code's
provisions, the court in Olo fson effectively abolished the buyer's option to
await performance. Whether this decision will be followed by other states
remains to be seen. An effective argument could easily be made that this
holding is not in accord with the Code's formulation: the remedies spelled
out in section 2-610 are disjunctive-a buyer has the right to await perform-
106. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-723 (1).
107. Id. § 2-712, Comment 2. The reasonableness of cover has not been directly
challenged in any anticipatory repudiation case. In Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.
3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973), the buyer covered almost a year after the repudiation.
The cover price was higher than the contract price, but the buyer sued for damages based
on the market price differential. Id. at 920, 296 N.E.2d at 873. The court, therefore,
was not confronted with the issue. However, it is clear that this unreasonably delayed
cover (substitute goods were readily available in the market place at the time of repudia-
tion) may have influenced its subsequent decision. See notes 108-10 infra and accom-
panying text.
108. 11 Ill. App. 3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973).
109. Id. at 921, 296 N.E.2d at 874.
110. Id. at 922, 296 N.E.2d at 875.
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ance and to recover market price. Additionally, the intent of the Code
formulators does not seem to coincide with the decision. 1 ' Clearly, there
has been no conclusive resolution of this problem. 112
B. The Seller's Options
The seller's remedies are in many ways analogous to the remedies
provided the aggrieved buyer. After repudiation the seller has the option
under section 2-706 of reselling the contract goods. This remedy is very
similar to the buyer's cover option.' 3 The seller can resell goods whenever
the buyer has repudiated the contract or has in some other way committed a
breach. Section 2-706 sets forth all of the details with regard to this seller's
remedy.
The Code states that when there is a proper resale, the seller is entitled to
recover the difference between the resale price and the contract price of the
goods.1 4  By this mechanism the seller is encouraged to resell; the only
defenses available to a buyer are a lack of good faith and that the acts of the
seller were unconscionable. As a result, in the absence of such contentions
the seller is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of damages. 15
However, there are provisions contained in this section which regulate the
method of resale and thus control any possible abuses. For example, the
section provides that the resale must be within a commercially reasonable
time." 6 In anticipatory repudiation cases the right to resell has provided an
effective alternative to an aggrieved seller. The commercially reasonable
time requirement has not in any way hampered the seller's recovery." 17
111. See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
112. The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Fredonia Broadcasting Corp.
v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973). The court in Fredonia also measured
market price differential damages based on the time of the repudiation. Id. at 800. This
was a trial court decision, however, which was not challenged by the buyer on appeal.
Other problems relating to buyers' remedies in anticipatory repudiation cases have
been resolved by the courts, although the decisions may not be followed by other juris-
dictions. It has been held that a buyer need not establish market price when he elects
to cover; his purchase is presumed proper and the burden of proof is on the seller to
show that the cover was not properly attained. Laredo Hides Co. v. H. & H. Meat
Prods. Co., 513 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
An aggrieved buyer can sue for both breach of warranty and a repudiation. Since § 2-
610 allows an aggrieved party to treat the contract as continuing in existence by await-
ing performance and, at the same time, sue for an anticipatory repudiation, the recovery
of damages for an anticipatory repudiation is, therefore, not an exclusive remedy. Fre-
donia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1973). A buyer who
seeks to rescind the contract after the repudiation cannot, however, at a later date re-
cover damages; rescission and damages are inconsistent remedies. Balon v. Hotel &
Restaurant Supplies, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 481, 433 P.2d 661 (1967).
113. The seller's option to resell is stated in more definitive terms than is the buyer's
option to cover. Thus, the seller can only recover the contract price when he is unable
to resell after a reasonable effort. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709(1). To some
extent, then, the seller's options are more restricted due to the fact that in most cases
an attempt to resell will have to be made. See Peters, supra note 2, at 261.
114. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706(1).
115. 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.05 (1974).
116. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706(1).
117. When a seller resold an airplane, nine months after repudiation, the resale effort
was held to be within a commercially reasonable time. Richards Aircraft Sales, Inc.
v. Vaughn, 203 Kan. 967, 457 P.2d 691 (1969). So long as the seller acts prudently
and with reasonable care and judgment the time of resale is to a large extent within
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In addition to the right of resale, section 2-708(1) imposes the pre-Code
damage measure in cases where the seller decides not to resell. Thus, the
seller can recover "the difference between the market price at the time and
place for tender and the unpaid contract price." 1 8  In unusual situations,
section 2-708(2) supplements this provision by providing that when the
measure of damages is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
he would have been had the contract been performed, the measure of
damages is the profit which the seller would have realized from the buyer's
full performance. 1 9 Market price is to be determined at the time and place
for tender, and if there is no market price, the Code permits the use of
market quotations if they are available.' 20 In a case where the suit is
brought for an anticipatory repudiation after the time for performance, the
market price will be determined according to the time and place provided for
performance. But, if the seller's suit comes to trial prior to the performance
date with respect to some or all of the goods due under the contract,
damages based on market price will be determined according to the price of
the goods prevailing at the time the aggrieved party learned of the repudia-
iton. 21
Thus, under the provisions of section 2-708, the seller's damages can vary
in terms of the time the case comes to trial. If the case comes to trial prior
to performance date, the aggrieved seller may have problems similar to those
the aggrieved buyer faces when attempting to determine the time he "learned
of" the anticipatory repudiation after he justifiably awaited performance fol-
lowing the repudiation. Of course, the seller's problem will be limited, for
the most part, to contracts performable over long periods of time. This may
his discretion. Id. at 973, 457 P.2d at 697. Similarly, when a buyer repudiated an order
of Christmas trees in September and the seller did not begin his efforts to resell until
December, the resale was still within a commercially reasonable time despite the market
price decrease in the last few weeks before the holiday. Whewell v. Dobson, 227
N.W.2d 115 (Iowa 1975). A buyer who claims that a resale should have occurred at a
different time when the market price was higher has little recourse due to both the un-
qualified "reasonable" standard and the seller's right to await performance under § 2-
610. Aura Orchards v. A. Peltz & Sons, 27 Agri. Dec. 1546, 6 UCC REP. SERV. 149
(1968). It has also been held that the seller need not give exact notification to the
buyer of his intention to resell, due to the fact that the statute does not require that
the buyer be notified of the proposed resale; the statute only requires the seller to give
the buyer reasonable notification of his intention to resell. Alco Standard Corp. v. F.
& B. Mfg. Co., 51 Ill. 2d 186, 281 N.E.2d 652 (1972). Contra, Portal Gallaries, Inc.
v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 523, 302 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
118. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708(1). This remedial provision has rarely
been used in anticipatory repudiation situations because of the alternative provisions
available and the encouragement to resell. To a large extent the cases involving § 2-
708(1) have been limited to goods not completed at the time of repudiation. See note
129 infra and accompanying text.
119. In many anticipatory repudiation situations sellers have recovered lost profits.
See, e.g., Caribtex Mfg. Corp. v. Barbitex Corp., 377 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1967) (seller
allowed to recover lost profits, including overhead, when buyer repudiated after seller
commenced manufacture); Alter & Sons v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 366 F.
Supp. 959 (S.D. Ill. 1973) (goods specially manufactured by seller for buyer); An-
chorage Centennial Dev. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596 (Alas.
1968) (unresellable gold-colored coins for centennial celebration); Prescon Corp. v.
Savoy Constr. Co., 259 Md. 52, 267 A.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1970) (repudiation after shop
drawings completed).
120. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-724.
121. Id. § 2-723(1).
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lead to some interesting trial docketing by attorneys trying to wait until per-
form ance date before bringing their case to trial.
Another remedy available to the aggrieved seller is the price remedy
contained in section 2-709 which allows the seller, in certain instances, to
recover the contract price from the repudiator. If the seller cannot resell for
a reasonable price within a reasonable time after the repudiation, he will be
entitled to recover the contract price. But, to do so the seller must hold the
goods identified to the contract, and if a possible resale appears he may resell
and deduct the net proceeds from the contract price. 1 22  The seller can sue
for the purchase price when the goods have already been accepted (or in the
case of an anticipatory repudiation, where the seller tenders performance
after the repudiation), 12' when the goods have been unjustifiably rejected
by the buyer and the seller cannot resell them, 1 24 and when the situation
involves conforming goods which have been lost or damaged within a
commercially reasonable time after the buyer has the risk of loss with regard
to them. 12 5 This provision has been utilized, to some extent, in anticipatory
repudiation cases. 126
If the seller has not completed manufacture of the goods involved in the
contract, he may recover the market price differential based on the possible
sale of the goods after completion of manufacturing less costs saved as a
consequence of the breach under section 2-708, or he may under section 2-
704, in the exercise of "reasonable commercial judgment for the purpose of
avoiding loss and of effective realization," complete the manufacture of the
goods and identify the goods to the contract. If this alternative is chosen,
the aggrieved seller upon the completion of the manufacturing process has
the same remedies available to him-namely, resale, market price differen-
tial, contract price, and lost profit-as he would have had if the contract had
been repudiated after production. This option is limited to some extent by
the provision that reasonable commercial judgment must be exercised. The
comment to this section points out that this reasonableness is determined
122. Id. § 2-709(2).
123. Id. § 2-709(l)(a).
124. Id. § 2-709(1)(b).
125. Id. § 2-709(1)(a). Under id. § 2-510(3) the risk of loss is said to rest with
the buyer when the buyer anticipatorily repudiates with respect to goods conforming to
the contract. In the limited situation where a suit for contract price may not be appro-
priate and the seller brings an unsuccessful action for the purchase price, he can still
recover damages for the breach of contract in the same action.
126. See Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.
1972) (seller who chose to keep the contract in effect following the buyer's repudiation
was entitled to recover the contract price despite his late delivery in the next shipment
under the installment contract); Multiplastics, Inc. v. Arch Indus., Inc., 14 UCC REP.
SEr. 573 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1974) (destruction of the contract goods by fire after the
buyer's repudiation, while the goods are still in the physical possession of the seller, al-
lows the seller to recover the contract price despite the fact that the seller awaited per-
formance and urged a retraction); Midwest Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Electric Regulator
Corp., 435 P.2d 89 (Okla. 1967) (testimony to the effect that the articles involved in
the contract were made up especially for a buyer's order and were unsuitable for pur-
poses other than filling that order, was sufficient to allow the aggrieved seller to recover
the contract price for the articles following the buyer's anticipatory repudiation). A
court has held that a seller does not have to make a reasonable effort to resell before
he can sue for the purchase price, where the buyer ordered a specific fur jacket with
alterations and subsequently refused delivery. Ludwig, Inc. v. Tobey, 28 Mass. App.
Dec. 6, 5 UCC REP. SEmy. 832 (1964).
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according to the facts and circumstances at the time the aggrieved seller
learns of the repudiation. 127  It is pointed out that any course of conduct is
reasonable unless circumstances make it "clear that such action will result in
a material increase in damages. ' 128  The burden is thus on the buyer to
show that this completion of manufacturing was invalid. The cases dealing
with this option have made it evident that a seller who elects to cease
manufacturing cannot recover the contract price, but he can recover lost
profits less costs saved as a consequence of the repudiation. 129
C. Problems
There are several problems inherent in the Code's formulation of damages
and remedies in situations involving an anticipatory repudiation. The
substitute transactions of resale and cover pose no particular problems, but
when the market contract differential is utilized in anticipatory repudiation
cases, several difficulties are presented. The seller's differential is computed
according to the time and place for performance unless the case comes to
trial prior to performance date; then the time he "learned of" the repudiation
is determinative. The buyer's differential is always calculated according to
the time he "learned of" the repudiation. There are three possible interpre-
tations of this buyer provision: (1) "learned of" is definitive and thus the
buyer must calculate his damages in terms of the time he was informed of
the breach; (2) "learned of" is only meant to apply to situations where a
repudiation occurs after performance date and thus it does not apply to an
anticipatory repudiation; and (3) as read in conjunction with section 2-610,
"learned of" means a reasonable time after the buyer is informed of the
breach since he does have the right to await performance.
For the sake of consistency, it could be argued that an aggrieved buyer
should have the same rights as the aggrieved seller. Consequently, the time
and place for performance should govern in a suit to recover the market
price differential. But, by adopting this interpretation, there would be no
immediate requirement that the aggrieved party mitigate damages. In fact,
the right to await performance can in the unusual case allow an aggrieved
buyer or seller either to maximize damages or to speculate in the market at
the repudiator's expense. Although this has never actually occurred, the
possibility exists. For example, the buyer who contracts for goods at a price
of $1000 to be delivered on December 1, first learns of the repudiation by
the seller on September 1. The market price on repudiation date is $800. If
the buyer covers at this time, he will only recover incidental and consequen-
tial damages. However, if the market price appears to be rising, he may be
127. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-704, Comment 2.
128. Id.
129. See Hodes v. Hoffman Int'l Corp., 280 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Detroit
Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 26 Mich. App. 478, 8 UCC REP. SERv. 504 (1970);
E-Z Roll Hardware Mfg. Co. v. H. & H. Prods. & Finishing Corp., 4 UCC REP. SERV.
1045 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1968); cf. Meledandi, Inc. v. Kohn, 7 UCC REP.
SEuv. 34 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1969) (holding that the appropriate remedy would
be based on the damage measure determined by market price if manufacturing had been
completed minus costs saved in consequence of the breach).
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able to benefit from doing nothing. Thus, on December 1 the market price
is up to $1200 and the buyer is now able to recover $200. On the other
hand, assuming the same contract, suppose the market price is $1200 when
the seller repudiates and it appears as if -the price will soon fall. It would be
beneficial to the buyer to cover immediately in order to recover more
damages. The situation works essentially the same for the seller in the case
of 'a buyer's repudiation. If a seller contracts to sell goods on December 1 at
a cost of $1000 and the market price is $1200 at the time of repudiation on
September 1 and the price appears to be declining, the seller could possibly
decide not to resell the goods. Thus, if the market price is down to $800 by
the time set for performance, he can recover $200 and retain the goods
without taking any affirmative action. Similarly, if the market price is $800
at the time of repudiation and it appears that the price may rise in the next
few months, it could be to his advantage to resell the goods and fix his
damage measure. Even in a less complex situation similar results may
occur. A buyer upon hearing of a seller's repudiation at a time when
market price equals contract price could decide not to act by means of cover
if he believes that the market price may rise by the time and place for
performance. A seller who is in the same situation with the market falling
may decide to suspend his resale efforts until the market price has declined.
Although such problems could occur, it is unlikely that they will occur.
Most buyers and sellers are more concerned with maximizing immediate
profits than the right to win a potential lawsuit. They would thus prefer to
channel their energies into maximizing profits, not damages for breach.
These hypotheticals also presuppose that the future price of goods is readily
ascertainable. Nevertheless, these examples demonstrate an interpretation
which could be given to the Code's provisions. It might be possible for an
aggrieved buyer or seller who is willing to take a chance and who is not
concerned with maximizing profits to speculate. In theory, then, the right to
await performance does not coincide with an appropriate damage measure.
A damage measure should reflect the harm suffered; it should never allow
an aggrieved party to recover more than he bargained for in the contract.'8 0
The Code formulators balanced the equities in favor of the aggrieved party
by giving him complete and unlimited options. Any possible usurpation of
these options could, to some extent, be contained by the good faith and
unconscionable act defenses. There are ways to restructure the Code
provisions to reflect more adequately the compensatory function of damages
without hindering the rights of the aggrieved party.131
130. See CORBIN § 990.
131. Damage measures should be integrally related to an incentive to fulfill a prom-
ise. Thus, the possibility of allowing an aggrieved party to maximize his damages may
be an added incentive to the repudiator not to repudiate. Sanctions, however, should
not lead to a waste of resources. Unbargained for and windfall gains are unnecessary;
damage recovery alone can adequately fulfill the needed incentive. In the extreme case
where an aggrieved party's recovery does not reflect the harm suffered, the additional
sanction allowed by the Code is superfluous. See generally R. POSNER, EcONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1973); Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach
of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES 277 (1972). For a critical analysis of Posner's work
and a suggestion for legal implementation of some of the basic principles, see Polinsky,
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The best solution would be to require an aggrieved party, whenever
possible, to enter into substitute transactions. 132  Thus, if the goods are
readily available or resalable in the market, there is no reason why an
aggrieved party should not be required to act within a reasonable time to
cover or resell. The only problem would come in terms of the buyer with
insufficient cash flow. In actuality, though, he will be left in the same
position as when the contract was agreed upon. The comment sections
should adequately explain this reasonable time requirement. A reasonable
time should depend on both the nature of the goods which are the subject of
the contract, and the nature of the contract itself. This would have to be
a question of fact, but certain guidelines could be promulgated. Thus, in the
case of an outright anticipatory repudiation, -the aggrieved party should be re-
quired to take affirmative action within a reasonable time after the repudiation
is communicated to him. In most short-term contracts the time for perform-
ance contained in the contract could be determinative. In long-term con-
tracts the time requirement should more adequately reflect the nature of
contract goods and the availability of substitute transactions. In either case,
when the goods are frequently bought or sold in the market place the
reasonable time would be shorter. Also, if the price of goods is less than
contract price at the time of repudiation and the goods are available or in
demand, the reasonable time should be measured in light of these factors.
Section 2-610 should not give the aggrieved party an unlimited right to await
performance. Instead, this right should to some extent be limited by these
time requirements. Such a provision requiring substitute transactions would
only have an adverse effect in the situation in which the aggrieved party may
not want to cover or resell due to his present lack of need for the contract
goods or his present inability or unwillingness to sell the goods. There is no
reason why these aggrieved parties should be compensated; in reality, they
have benefited from the repudiation.
This is not to say, however, that all aggrieved parties would be required to
enter into substitute transactions. In some cases, the goods may have been
specially manufactured for the buyer or they may be unobtainable in the
market place. A full volume seller, for instance, may have resold the
contract goods, but this resale may have reduced the total amount of sales
possible. In these situations the other damage provisions of the Code would
be operative. A buyer who is unable to secure substitute goods may thus
sue for the market price differential. The time for performance would be
determinative for measurement purposes. A seller who is unable to resell
contract goods could recover profit when the goods are not salvageable, and
in other cases where the goods are salvageable or recyclable recover the
Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's
Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1655 (1974).
132. Other solutions have been suggested. One author has stated that the aggrieved
party should be offered two time periods to invoke the market price differential: the
time of the repudiation if notice of acceptance of the repudiation is then communicated
to the repudiator and a reasonable time thereafter if no retraction of the repudiation
has been received by the aggrieved party. Peters, supra note 2, at 267.
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market price differential less expenses saved in consequence of the breach.
The full volume seller should also be allowed to recover profit.
Such provisions would effectuate the compensatory function of damages.
An aggrieved party could wait a reasonable time after the repudiation while
attempting to stabilize his position, but could not wait until the time for
performance under the contract before chanelling his output into other uses
or finding some other transactions to fulfill his needs. In the same vein, an
aggrieved seller who is informed of an anticipatory repudiation while in the
process of manufacturing goods for the buyer at the time of the repudiation
should be required to cease manufacture immediately unless he is able to
find a substitute contract. The test for cessation of manufacture under the
present Code is "reasonable commercial judgment"; the seller is allowed to
complete manufacture so long as in his judgment he will be able to resell the
goods when they are completed. In some instances such a decision may be
economically and commercially reasonable at the time of the repudiation, but
not at the time of completion; the demand for such goods may no longer
exist or the price of such goods may have declined. There would be a more
efficient allocation of market resources if the seller's energies were channelled
into the manufacturing of specific contract goods. Likewise, it seems un-
tenable that a seller should be able to tender a useless performance following
an anticipatory repudiation. A fully productive economic system requires
that goods be utilized and not wasted. This goal is not promoted by this
unnecessary rule of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recognition of the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation caused several
definitional and remedial problems. To a large extent these difficulties were
alleviated by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. In an effort to
explain better the nature of a repudiation and to allow greater flexibility to
the aggrieved party the Code recategorized the principle and provided new
remedial options for the aggrieved party. Through these mechanisms the
law on anticipatory repudiation was clarified and the positions of buyers and
sellers in the market place were made more secure.
However, the Code is not without its own difficulties and, thus, several
revisions would enhance the Code's formulation. The difference between
insecurity under section 2-609 and an anticipatory repudiation under section
2-610 should be more adequately explained and clarified. Also, the remedi-
al provisions available to the aggrieved party should be revised in order to
insure effective utilization of goods and resources while, at the same time,
allowing sufficient choices to the aggrieved party. If these changes were
incorporated in the Code, the provisions would more adequately reflect the
expectations of the business community and would provide a more coherent
mechanism for ordering the relationships between buyers and sellers.
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